Current Events > Thesis + Antithesis = Synthesis

(+) Yeah! (+)

The Synthesis becomes the new Thesis, and the cycle continues.

This is the Hegelian dialectic.

Cool, Hegel is great

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Antinatalism is my copilot

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Troy + (Horse) Decoy = Destroy
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Yup

imo were in a meaning / liberty dialectic with the sublation being voluntary suffering (Which gives us both liberty and meaning)

but not quite there yet and dont have enough room on CE to fully flesh that idea out

Romes187 posted...

Yup

imo were in a meaning / liberty dialectic with the sublation being voluntary suffering (Which gives us both liberty and meaning)

but not quite there yet and dont have enough room on CE to fully flesh that idea out

I'm intrigued. I'll read what you have to say.

Josiah_Is_Back posted...

I'm intrigued. I'll read what you have to say.

appreciate it. if I have some time Ill get in detail. Starting point is the teasing apart of voluntary liberty and involuntary liberty (somewhat similar to negative and positive liberty). And the assumption that responsibility is what meaning is (or whether something is meaningful to you). And you can quickly find that voluntary liberty is in direct opposition to a meaningful life.

ive got about 55k words written on this and how it flows into aesthetics and influences our societal structure but its a work in progress.

I was actually wondering if you can reverse the dialectical method by starting with a world spirit state description and then reducing it to more basic functives. And then use the functives to construct a new function that expresses whether the world spirit is static or progressive. The hypothesis from there would be that static ideas logically require major events to move the world spirit forward.

Sounds like the materialist dialectic, but even that sublates toward greater complexity. This kinda boils something down and then rebuilds it into an archetype. It might be not unlike deconstruction, I guess.

I also sometimes wonder what the representational content of being-Hegel entails, and if it is good or bad.

And representational content in this topic would logically necessitate a being-Schopenhauer...

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Romes187 posted...

appreciate it. if I have some time Ill get in detail. Starting point is the teasing apart of voluntary liberty and involuntary liberty (somewhat similar to negative and positive liberty). And the assumption that responsibility is what meaning is (or whether something is meaningful to you). And you can quickly find that voluntary liberty is in direct opposition to a meaningful life.

ive got about 55k words written on this and how it flows into aesthetics and influences our societal structure but its a work in progress.

Since TC doesnt care about my shit I'll just talk to you <_<

Do new concepts come into existence or do the limits of human reason mean there are a finite amount of concepts that just get recycled?

Also why is liberty the negation of meaning here?

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Romes187 posted...

appreciate it. if I have some time Ill get in detail. Starting point is the teasing apart of voluntary liberty and involuntary liberty (somewhat similar to negative and positive liberty). And the assumption that responsibility is what meaning is (or whether something is meaningful to you). And you can quickly find that voluntary liberty is in direct opposition to a meaningful life.

ive got about 55k words written on this and how it flows into aesthetics and influences our societal structure but its a work in progress.

Nvm I didnt see this post, or I guess Injust ignored it.

You seem to have started this logic with the negation, assuming you actually meant meaning is posited before liberty, since you put that first in the binary in your earlier post...

But if liberty is posited first and you have a distinction between positive and negative liberty, the negation should have the same functional distinction (since the negation of positive and negative liberty would require negatives and positives respectively...). Becoming/sublation is the result of negation because the negation is functionally equivalent to the thesis, but conceptually opposed to it. That's how Hegel grounds the dialectic by starting with being and nothingness, and their equivocation. Similarly being and essence are sublated into the concept/notion because the essence of being is essence and the being of essence is being...

So in your case the negation of liberty by meaning (though I think you meant it the other way around) and its species would essentially be formally equivalent to the negation at the level of content, which would suggest there is positive responsibility and negative responsibility, and if you accept that, which you should, then there is already going to be both forms of each concept negating each other.

/seething and coping

So ultimately a meaningful life cannot be the outcome of this, because if there is a 1:1 correlation between the derivative notions then it wouldnt be one sided enough for there to be no meaningful lives at all... since there is nothing for the negation to posit

If a person has negative responsibility or avoidance to what makes life meaningful then there is already going to be something that limits progress toward that as a concrete idea, which ultimately amounts to saying that people with meaningful lives have meaningful lives because responsible people are responsible

/more seething and coping

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MedeaLysistrata posted...

So ultimately a meaningful life cannot be the outcome of this, because if there is a 1:1 correlation between the derivative notions then it wouldnt be one sided enough for there to be no meaningful lives at all... since there is nothing for the negation to posit

If a person has negative responsibility or avoidance to what makes life meaningful then there is already going to be something that limits progress toward that as a concrete idea, which ultimately amounts to saying that people with meaningful lives have meaningful lives because responsible people are responsible

/more seething and coping

Also spirit is the outcome of the rational dialectic, so what I'm trying to say in the second part of the post is just that if that is all there is to it, then the rational element as a spiritual unity is just determinism. It's not possible to say that positive liberty and positive meaning meaning or negative liberty and negative meaning (which would be a requirement for rational negation) can result in any kind of meaningful life however you want to spin it, since they amount to the same thing and it just falls on the individual whether they are negative or positively inclined with respect to responsibility.

/peak seething and coping

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Hegel is 200 years old and his theories have been improved upon grow up

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josifrees posted...

Hegel is 200 years old and his theories have been improved upon grow up

Who would you recommend instead?

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What about thebro?

MedeaLysistrata posted...

Nvm I didnt see this post, or I guess Injust ignored it.

You seem to have started this logic with the negation, assuming you actually meant meaning is posited before liberty, since you put that first in the binary in your earlier post...

But if liberty is posited first and you have a distinction between positive and negative liberty, the negation should have the same functional distinction (since the negation of positive and negative liberty would require negatives and positives respectively...). Becoming/sublation is the result of negation because the negation is functionally equivalent to the thesis, but conceptually opposed to it. That's how Hegel grounds the dialectic by starting with being and nothingness, and their equivocation. Similarly being and essence are sublated into the concept/notion because the essence of being is essence and the being of essence is being...

So in your case the negation of liberty by meaning (though I think you meant it the other way around) and its species would essentially be formally equivalent to the negation at the level of content, which would suggest there is positive responsibility and negative responsibility, and if you accept that, which you should, then there is already going to be both forms of each concept negating each other.

/seething and coping

So ultimately a meaningful life cannot be the outcome of this, because if there is a 1:1 correlation between the derivative notions then it wouldnt be one sided enough for there to be no meaningful lives at all... since there is nothing for the negation to posit

If a person has negative responsibility or avoidance to what makes life meaningful then there is already going to be something that limits progress toward that as a concrete idea, which ultimately amounts to saying that people with meaningful lives have meaningful lives because responsible people are responsible

/more seething and coping

Nice post. You're definitely more well read in Hegel than I am.

So it's not negative responsibility and positive responsibility, but involuntary responsibility (the ability for one to find meaning in ones life) and voluntary responsibility (the limiting of ones voluntary liberty). I used positive and negative liberty because its a more familiar term but my concepts are slightly different.

Here's a snippet from my writings with more concrete examples

Involuntary liberty is the original idea I laid out it is the freedom to make your own path in life to find happiness and meaning. In a Sartrean way, it is consciousness itself (through which we can experience and adopt voluntary responsibility). We do not choose it, and it is a function of that same consciousness creating social systems (a will to meaning?) allowing us to live without impediments to a fulfilling life, should we choose to live one. We cannot choose to not have this liberty as we are born either with it or without it (in varying amounts throughout history). This is liberty that moves us (or at least allows us to move) closer to meaning.

The second and newer type of liberty is voluntary liberty. This is the freedom to do what you want, except towards those things which you adopt responsibility towards. For example, if you have a social paradigm in which you are able to find both a life partner and have children in a meaningful way, that means you had the involuntary liberty (the ability to adopt responsibility) to do so. The State did not jump in to prevent you from doing so, we have a culture that lets us know we are supposed to stick around as the parent, and a whole slew of other smaller things allows us to actually exist as the concept of Mother or Father.

As a parent, you will have to limit what you are able to do because you are now responsible for your child. This means no more going out late, no more sleeping in, etc. By adopting responsibility towards your children, you give up your voluntary liberty. You COULD go out late and sleep in every night, despite having a child who needs you. But all this means is you are adopting less responsibility towards them, and thus you are moving away from a meaningful life. Any voluntary liberty you take on is equivalent to not adopting responsibility towards whatever it is you are taking voluntary liberty towards, or to put it another way, you lose meaning in your life.

and here's my "preface" to diving into one of Hegel's dialectics a bit more

When we look at it this way, our dialectic changes from liberty-authoritarianism to liberty-meaning. Authoritarianism is an error by us putting our faith in the State to create meaning that should normally come from the individual, the family, and society along with the State (in an authoritarian manner, but not necessarily forced by threat of violence). Once that error is corrected, all we are left with is liberty on one hand and meaning on the other. Nietzsche was a bit closer when he proclaimed the death of God as well as predicting the ebb and flow from Nihilism (liberty) on one side, and authoritarianism (meaning) on the other. In fact, this death of God can be extended beyond simply faith it was the death of responsibility for the structures of our society. And so, the State has been able to take over as we attempt to inject meaning into our lives without wanting to take on and revive this responsibility.

This is the true dialectic it is not Hegels master and slave because those are simply characters representing these deeper concepts. The master is liberty, the slave is meaning, and the sublimation is voluntary suffering (higher order meaning). Lets look at how this works and see how we are confusing authoritarianism with responsibility and meaning.

I need to go through this and read it again...been about a year since I've put any real thought into the project

MedeaLysistrata posted...

Who would you recommend instead?

probably sartre

i like hegel. I like logocentric thinking

Oh and here's a snippet with me trying to explain where I feel the tension is in the dialectic

This idea of involuntary liberty as being the ability to limit your voluntary liberties (and create meaning) is what creates the tension between the two sides. Social order can indeed provide meaning, but it can become so rigid that it inhibits the ability of the citizens to take on voluntary responsibility. We cannot forgo all liberties for a life of absolute and infinite meaning, but we also cannot have pure liberty with no sense of meaning. In both cases, our consciousness would be unable to experience anything at all. If everything has infinite meaning, everything is meaningless. If everything is meaningless, there is no self-awareness because you must find meaning in something to be aware of it.

This is the inner tension that creates the dialectic. We need meaning in our lives to experience things and to protect us against suffering, and this meaning requires freedom to take up responsibility. But the structures that allow us to do this, our social and political order, become weakened by too much freedom. This in turn will sublate with the social order to create our new synthesis. What do we get when we synthesize meaning and liberty? Voluntary suffering (in varying degrees).

Romes187 posted...

This is the true dialectic it is not Hegels master and slave because those are simply characters representing these deeper concepts. The master is liberty, the slave is meaning, and the sublimation is voluntary suffering (higher order meaning). Lets look at how this works and see how we are confusing authoritarianism with responsibility and meaning.

Hegel does oppose absolute freedom and terror, I can't remember if it comes before or after lordship and bondage though. I think a later development...

Romes187 posted...

The second and newer type of liberty is voluntary liberty. This is the freedom to do what you want, except towards those things which you adopt responsibility towards

This seems very unintuitive to me, like I get the idea behind it, and that part certainly makes sense, but I just dont understand what makes this voluntary liberty over something like limit liberty. But that is just a semantic quibble.

Romes187 posted...

State to create meaning that should normally come from the individual, the family, and society along with the State (in an authoritarian manner, but not necessarily forced by threat of violence). Once that error is corrected, all we are left with is liberty on one hand and meaning on the other.

A lot of feminists would argue that the family is also authoritarian. Take that however you want, I guess. But also that was more of a 2nd wave feminism thing, such an argument might be dead. Personally I think the individual is the greatest form of authoritarianism precisely because it is necessarily conscious.

Romes187 posted...

Nice post. You're definitely more well read in Hegel than I am.

Thank you :p

Romes187 posted...

Involuntary liberty is the original idea I laid out it is the freedom to make your own path in life to find happiness and meaning. In a Sartrean way, it is consciousness itself (through which we can experience and adopt voluntary responsibility). We do not choose it, and it is a function of that same consciousness creating social systems (a will to meaning?) allowing us to live without impediments to a fulfilling life, should we choose to live one. We cannot choose to not have this liberty as we are born either with it or without it (in varying amounts throughout history). This is liberty that moves us (or at least allows us to move) closer to meaning.

Consciousness as involuntary liberty sure makes sense. I guess following from Hegel, voluntary liberty would be self consciousness. Or being for another for Sartre.

I think you might end up being a utilitarian if you have to defend the view that taking on responsibility increases happiness and voluntary liberty is worthwhile...

Thanks for sharing

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Romes187 posted...

probably sartre

i like hegel. I like logocentric thinking

Yeah he's fine too. I guess I like his phenomenology stuff more than the outright existentialist stuff.

Romes187 posted...

This idea of involuntary liberty as being the ability to limit your voluntary liberties (and create meaning) is what creates the tension between the two sides. Social order can indeed provide meaning, but it can become so rigid that it inhibits the ability of the citizens to take on voluntary responsibility. We cannot forgo all liberties for a life of absolute and infinite meaning, but we also cannot have pure liberty with no sense of meaning. In both cases, our consciousness would be unable to experience anything at all. If everything has infinite meaning, everything is meaningless. If everything is meaningless, there is no self-awareness because you must find meaning in something to be aware of it.

This is the inner tension that creates the dialectic. We need meaning in our lives to experience things and to protect us against suffering, and this meaning requires freedom to take up responsibility. But the structures that allow us to do this, our social and political order, become weakened by too much freedom. This in turn will sublate with the social order to create our new synthesis. What do we get when we synthesize meaning and liberty? Voluntary suffering (in varying degrees).

At this point it kind of sounds like Jordan Peterson? Idk

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MedeaLysistrata posted...

A lot of feminists would argue that the family is also authoritarian. Take that however you want, I guess. But also that was more of a 2nd wave feminism thing, such an argument might be dead. Personally I think the individual is the greatest form of authoritarianism precisely because it is necessarily conscious.

Funny enough this is all part of a larger framework that deals with separate "spheres of existence" (individual, familial, societal, state) and each has their own version of how responsibility manifests. Morals, passions, loyalties, duties respectively. But yes, each "sphere" can become corrupt. Which is actually part of the tension I posted above.

MedeaLysistrata posted...

I think you might end up being a utilitarian if you have to defend the view that taking on responsibility increases happiness and voluntary liberty is worthwhile...

responsibility does not increase happiness. The overall goal (well if there is one) of my writing was to figure out how to minimize net suffering. And I truly believe meaning is the antidote to it, despite suffering riding along with it at every step. The problem occurs when items are moved from the realm of voluntary to involuntary (i.e. via laws or, say, the church back in the day, or even societal shame).

While still producing meaning, the "involuntariness" of it actually increases net overall suffering (if we assume something of an equation like net suffering = suffering - meaning) because the meaning gained by being forced to be responsible is not as strong as voluntarily doing so.

Obviously the thoughts need a lot of work, but I haven't read some of this in a while so its kinda fun....especially my high thoughts on aesthetics haha

The romantics like Wordsworth went from a mimetic view of poetry (objective, trying to copy the object) to a supermimetic version in that the poet gives their view on the supraideal version of the object. This isnt to say Wordsworth wasnt interested in a higher truth. He believed that by doing what he laid out, the artist could transcend the objective and subjective (into a new synthesis) and find deeper truths. The problem is he should have realized this deeper truth is still just the ideal in the world of Being you cannot transcend an ideal by definition and thus the ideal object has that synthesis built into it as a necessary characteristic of being ideal. When the shift from ontology to epistemology happens within art, we move from an involuntary arena to a voluntary arena. Ontologically (pre-Burkean), the art must be idealistically mimetic, and thus we are in a realm of involuntary action. We did not have a choice to go outside these mimetic bounds, as that would be a break in decorum. Epistemologically, the art isnt necessarily mimetic, though it can be (and ought to be a la Wordsworth and Coleridge). And this is the important aspect once we view art epistemologically (and with an emphasis on imagination over judgement a change the Romantics made from Burke), we are in the realm of voluntary action. We can break the rules (we are free from God), but we ought to still set limits to this (we must become God). Again, the parallel to a child entering adulthood is apt. We have shed our nave chains and are completely free to do whatever our self-expression drives us towards. The goal is still the mimesis of the ideal in the world of Being (something the later Romantics and modernists got wrong), but this mimesis is now a voluntary fusion of subject and object. It is the divine coming down from the object into the subject if done correctly.

MedeaLysistrata posted...

At this point it kind of sounds like Jordan Peterson? Idk

Close

Victor Frankl

Peterson definitely used a lot of his ideas in his talks as well. I think he has some stuff wrong, but some of the stuff makes sense to me.

Ave, true to Caesar.
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Romes187 posted...

Funny enough this is all part of a larger framework that deals with separate "spheres of existence" (individual, familial, societal, state) and each has their own version of how responsibility manifests. Morals, passions, loyalties, duties respectively. But yes, each "sphere" can become corrupt. Which is actually part of the tension I posted above.

Also how they would conflict, I guess? Interesting stuff there. Sharing this because it's somewhat related but mostly I just like the diagram:

Romes187 posted...

The problem occurs when items are moved from the realm of voluntary to involuntary (i.e. via laws or, say, the church back in the day, or even societal shame).

Fair enough. Am I right in guessing you are less inclined when it comes to supporting taxation? Or would that be too concrete? Because I am still a bit confused on the terminology using voluntary and involuntary.

Going back and reading older stuff is always fun for me. Also interesting that you put ontology as prior to epistemology... that is truly the greatest rabbit hole, probably

Romes187 posted...

Close

Victor Frankl

Peterson definitely used a lot of his ideas in his talks as well. I think he has some stuff wrong, but some of the stuff makes sense to me.

Interesting, is that where the voluntary/involuntary liberties distinction is from?

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MedeaLysistrata posted...

Fair enough. Am I right in guessing you are less inclined when it comes to supporting taxation? Or would that be too concrete? Because I am still a bit confused on the terminology using voluntary and involuntary.

Going back and reading older stuff is always fun for me. Also interesting that you put ontology as prior to epistemology... that is truly the greatest rabbit hole, probably

I am wary of too many taxes but understand the need for some because the State in my framework is a necessity for connecting various "societies" (groups of different familial groups sharing similar underpinnings) and offers an outlet of responsibility (increases involuntary liberty...I know I get confused too) via duty.

Another way of thinking about involuntary is using the idea of "thrownness" from Heidegger. It's the situation you are born in. You're born now, where we have ideas of "familiy", "parent", "children", etc...the State doesn't rip your kids away from you...you are able to 'become' a meaningful role. But you have to voluntarily take it.

As far as Ontology preceding epistemology, mimetic ideals of poetry (or art) came first and is grounded in an ontological framework. It was the later romantics that elevated the subject over the object.

Aesthetics and architecture are cool subjects. For architecture I like Roger Scruton though I'm sure on this board he isn't well received due to his politics. But his ideas on form and function make sense to me (he claims it is rather funny how we find new function for beautiful forms and we repurpose those. I'm not a big form follows function type of person as it removes all beauty from our built world!)

MedeaLysistrata posted...

Interesting, is that where the voluntary/involuntary liberties distinction is from?

No, I got a lot about the nature of suffering and meaning from his book (Man's search for meaning). He was a Nazi POW and its revealing how he was able to get through that. If anyone knows about suffering, I'd imagine its him. Peterson obviously read his works as well and talks about the same themes.

The voluntary/involuntary distinction was me trying to figure out why liberalism today is so different from classical liberalism. I think its because classical liberalism was built on elevating involuntary meaning (build society so individuals can go out and live as meaningful a life as they want) and liberalism today elevates voluntary liberty (you ought to be able to take whatever action you want and there should be no loss of quality of life)...or something in that realm.

Romes187 posted...

I am wary of too many taxes but understand the need for some because the State in my framework is a necessity for connecting various "societies" (groups of different familial groups sharing similar underpinnings) and offers an outlet of responsibility (increases involuntary liberty...I know I get confused too) via duty.

I was mostly just trying to relate your ideas to something concrete to see if I understood them.

Romes187 posted...

As far as Ontology preceding epistemology, mimetic ideals of poetry (or art) came first and is grounded in an ontological framework. It was the later romantics that elevated the subject over the object.

Fair enough, but naturalist epistemology could lead someone to creating art that presumes that mimesis is possible at all. But I have a hard time conceptualizing how art can be ontological or epistemological tout court, rather than just being separately aesthetic in it's own realm. Clearly there can be themes of the other two concepts? Not sure, I've mostly stayed away from aesthetics.

Romes187 posted...

..you are able to 'become' a meaningful role. But you have to voluntarily take it.

Yeah. I mean Sartre has a good example of a waiter who is also a writer but I can't recall it at the moment...

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Hah I did have a section about the waiter thing but I didn't really expand on it too much. I think this was a case of me reading another philosopher, liking the idea, and figuring out how to shoehorn it into my writing

Sartre believed those acting in bad faith, such as our waiter, are play acting as objects in the world. This is the farthest from the truth and the banality of a waiter seems to me a convenient example Sartre chose to use. Sure it seems rather ridiculous to embody the spirit of something as meager as a waiter, but as shown above, when we switch waiter to father or citizen, a case can be made for a certain utility in the uniformity it creates there are a million ways to be a father, but few work well. We need to use the spirit of culture to guide us around these tough inquiries. That is the type of being we are. We are acting in good faith while embodying spirits because that is who we are something Sartre would agree on as he did not believe we could escape bad faith. My issue is his use of the word bad implying that the alternative is preferred or privileged.

He goes on to claim that acting in bad faith is a denial of ones own freedom YES! To what end? Ironically enough for Sartre, responsibility and meaning! He claims they use the very freedom they have to deny their freedoms, and what he is describing is involuntary liberty. Bad faith IS involuntary liberty.

Hmm I think its been way too long....I'm not super secure in what I'm even trying to say here haha

Romes187 posted...

Hah I did have a section about the waiter thing but I didn't really expand on it too much. I think this was a case of me reading another philosopher, liking the idea, and figuring out how to shoehorn it into my writing

Hmm I think its been way too long....I'm not super secure in what I'm even trying to say here haha

Yeah, I mean I was thinking that the example was something like the writer cannot be authentic because there is a more necessary being, but that doesn't seem like the point/spirit of the example... idk


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I would definitely defer to Medea since they are MUCH more well versed in Hegel.

You can gleam a bit from his introductions (this topic actually inspired me to reread the book below)

https://www.amazon.com/Reading-Hegel-Introductions-Transmission-G/dp/0980544017

It is not anywhere near the level of nuance in the complete works, but will give you a good starting point and connect his thoughts.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Phenomenology_of_Spirit

This is the big one. The philosophy of right is interesting too but gotta say Hegel is extremely hard to read and when I go through a paragraph of his, I find I've retained like 1% of it and have to reread it so many times....his sentences!!!

Another great philosopher from around this time is Fichte, though he isn't nearly as read as Hegel. His stuff is really weird and there are written lectures he gave going over his "science of knowing" or whatever he calls it. What's cool about it is the understanding of what he is saying comes about from actually understanding the understanding haha. So its an active approach.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QW8b_cnhql0

That guy has a nice lecture series on Hegel's work, goes over it paragraph by paragraph and gives his thoughts on it. Haven't checked out any of his other videos really but his hegel ones are cool because he knows his hegel

Personally I find Science of Logic is a lot easier to read than the Phenomenology, especially the Lesser Logic (condensed version), which is written as an encyclopedia. I would probably say start there.

Edit: Sadler is pretty great, that would be a good secondary source if you just want to dive into the Phenomenology directly. I dont have a lot of experience with secondary sources for Hegel though, unfortunately.

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