'John is very knowledgeable almost to a fault, as it gets in the way at times when issues arise,' the boss wrote in one of his withering performance reviews, downgrading Barnetts rating from a 40 all the way to a 15 in an assessment that cast the 26-year quality manager, who was known as Swampy for his easy Louisiana drawl, as an anal-retentive prick whose pedantry was antagonizing his colleagues. The truth, by contrast, was self-evident to anyone who spent five minutes in his presence: John Barnett, who raced cars in his spare time and seemed high on life according to one former colleague, was a great, fun boss that loved Boeing and was willing to share his knowledge with everyone, as one of his former quality technicians would later recall.
But Swampy was mired in an institution that was in a perpetual state of unlearning all the lessons it had absorbed over a 90-year ascent to the pinnacle of global manufacturing. Like most neoliberal institutions, Boeing had come under the spell of a seductive new theory of knowledge that essentially reduced the whole concept to a combination of intellectual property, trade secrets, and data, discarding thought and understanding and complex reasoning possessed by a skilled and experienced workforce as essentially not worth the increased health care costs. CEO Jim McNerney, who joined Boeing in 2005, had last helmed 3M, where management as he saw it had overvalued experience and undervalued leadership before he purged the veterans into early retirement.
Prince Jimas some long-timers used to call himrepeatedly invoked a slur for longtime engineers and skilled machinists in the obligatory vanity leadership book he co-wrote. Those who cared too much about the integrity of the planes and not enough about the stock price were phenomenally talented assholes, and he encouraged his deputies to ostracize them into leaving the company. He initially refused to let nearly any of these talented assholes work on the 787 Dreamliner, instead outsourcing the vast majority of the development and engineering design of the brand-new, revolutionary wide-body jet to suppliers, many of which lacked engineering departments. The plan would save money while busting unions, a win-win, he promised investors. Instead, McNerneys plan burned some $50 billion in excess of its budget and went three and a half years behind schedule.
Swampy belonged to one of the cleanup crews that Boeing detailed to McNerneys disaster area. The supplier to which Boeing had outsourced part of the 787 fuselage had in turn outsourced the design to an Israeli firm that had botched the job, leaving the supplier strapped for cash in the midst of a global credit crunch. Boeing would have to bail outand buy outthe private equity firm that controlled the supplier. In 2009, Boeing began recruiting managers from Washington state to move east to the suppliers non-union plant in Charleston, South Carolina, to train the workforce to properly put together a plane.
But after the FAA cleared Boeing to deliver its first 787s to customers around the end of 2011, one of Swampys old co-workers says that McNerneys henchmen began targeting anyone with experience and knowledge for torment and termination. One of Swampys closest colleagues, Bill Seitz, took a demotion to go back west. A quality control engineer named John Woods was terminated for insisting inspectors thoroughly document damage and repair performed on composite materials, which were far less resilient than steel. Good machinists and inspectors who wore wristbands in support of a union drive were framed with dubious infractions. Everyone from Everett started dropping like flies, remembers a former manager at the plant.
Theres a form we all had to sign that says you take responsibility for anything that goes wrong, and it states pretty clearly that if something happens to a plane because of something you did wrong, you can face a major fine or jail time for that, the manager recalled. The Everett managers took that seriously. Charleston leadership did not.
The bosses hit Swampy with a new initiative called Multi-Function Process Performer, through which quality inspectors were directed to outsource 90 percent of their duties to the mechanics they were supposed to be supervising.This was supposed to speed up production and save Boeing millions once it successfully shed the thousands of inspectors it intended to axe. Swampy believed relying on mechanics to self-inspect their work was not only insane but illegal under the Federal Aviation Administration charter, which explicitly required quality inspectors to document all defects detected, work performed, and parts installed on a commercial airplane in one centralized database. Swampy knew he was caught in a prisoners dilemma. If he went along, he was breaking the law; if he didnt, whistleblowers who complained about unsafe practices were routinely terminated on grounds of violating the same safety protocols they had opposed violating.
Swampy calculated that it would be a bigger pain for Boeing to fire him for doing the right thing than following orders, so he kept his head down and continued managing his inspectors as though he were back in Everett, taking special care to meticulously record every episode of noncompliance (and nonconformance, which is similar but not identical) he encountered. He documented his discovery that machinists installing floor panels had been littering long titanium slivers into wire bundles and electrical boxes between the floorboards and the cargo compartment ceiling panels, where they risked causing an electrical short. A series of mysterious battery fires had already caused the FAA to ground the 787 for a few months just over a year after the first plane had been delivered. He wrote that 75 out of a package of 300 oxygen masks slated for installation on a plane did not actually pump oxygen. His team compiled a list of 300 defects on a fuselage scheduled for delivery, and he discovered that more than 400 nonconforming aircraft parts had gone missing from the defective parts cage and likely been installed on planes illegally and without documentation, by managers and mechanics desperate to get them out the door.
Few quality managers were as stubborn as Swampy. A Seattle Times story detailed an internal Boeing document boasting that the incidence of manufacturing defects on the 787 had plunged 20 percent in a single year, which inspectors anonymously attributed to the bullying environment in which defects had systematically stopped being documented by inspectors. They werent fooling customers: Qatar Airways had become so disgusted with the state of the planes it received from Charleston that it refused to accept them, and even inspired the Qatar-owned Al Jazeera to produce a withering documentary called Broken Dreams, in which an employee outfitted with a hidden camera chitchatted with mechanics and inspectors about the planes they were producing. They hire these people off the street, dude fucking flipping burgers for a living, making sandwiches at Subway, one mechanic marveled of his colleagues; another regaled the narrator with tales of co-workers who came to work high on coke and painkillers and weed because no one had ever had a urine test. Asked if they would fly the 787 Dreamliner; just five of 15 answered yes, and even the positive responses did Boeing no favors: I probably would, but I have kind of a death wish, too.