Current Events > Is 'morality' subjective or objective?

(+) Yeah! (+)

The_Apologist posted...

What counts as evidence that something exists outside the human mind? Do we have evidence that anything exists outside the human mind?

I mean, we have evidence of things that only exist inside a human mind in the form of lucid dreams. And there are extensive differences between them and objective reality. The accuracy of human perception to measure objective reality is debatable, but we don't need to be accurate observers to discover objective truths.

videospirit posted...

And there are extensive differences between them and objective reality.

Dreaming experience is different from waking experience, but this doesn't entail that waking experience is veridical.

videospirit posted...

we don't need to be accurate observers to discover objective truths.

I agree that that isn't a requirement. But this doesn't demonstrate that we are discovering objective truths.

The_Apologist posted...

Dreaming experience is different from waking experience, but this doesn't entail that waking experience is veridical.

The differences between dreaming experience and waking experience is the evidence that there is an objective reality at all and that all of objective reality isn't just a figment of our imagination.

I agree that that isn't a requirement. But this doesn't demonstrate that we are discovering objective truths.

If we were not discovering objective truths, contradictions would arise between our observations and objective reality that would impact our objective forms in some way. The lack of such contradictions is the evidence.

The_Apologist posted...

That's not my view. I think it's possible to have evidence for the objectivity of things. There's no empirical test, of course; the only option is philosophical argumentation. But this opens the door to moral realism, even as it rescues us from solipsism.

I see.

In that regard I take a more pragmatist position. It seems as if there is an objective reality, therefore it is meet to behave as if there is. From this I hope you can see how my view of practical effect as a stand in for evidential existence works. An existence indistinguishable from non-existence is paramount to not existing.

videospirit posted...

The differences between dreaming experience and waking experience is the evidence that there is an objective reality at all and that all of objective reality isn't just a figment of our imagination.

I don't see how. The difference is compatible with solipsism--as is all possible experience.

videospirit posted...

If we were not discovering objective truths, contradictions would arise between our observations and objective reality

But this is assuming that we're in contact with objective reality in the first place. It's possible that we aren't. (But I'm not trying to contend that we aren't, to be clear.)

Daremo posted...

It seems as if there is an objective reality, therefore it is meet to behave as if there is.

I don't necessarily disagree, although 'seems' is doing a lot of work there. Why can't we say that it seems as if there are objective moral facts?

The_Apologist posted...

I don't see how. The difference is compatible with solipsism--as is all possible experience.

Because the differences between dreaming experience and waking experience can only occur if an objective reality exists and is interacting with us. No matter how much we don't believe something that is part of objective reality exists, it still interferes with our observations in a consistent manner. Our dreaming experience shows us that things that lack a form in objective reality are impermanent and have no ability to consistently affect our observations.

But this is assuming that we're in contact with objective reality in the first place. It's possible that we aren't. (But I'm not trying to contend that we aren't, to be clear.)

And being in contact with objective reality is what causes the phenomenon that allow us to differentiate between waking experience and dreaming experience. The differences between waking experience and dreaming experience both prove that objective reality exists and prove that we're in contact with it at the same time.

videospirit posted...

No matter how much we don't believe something that is part of objective reality exists, it still interferes with our observations in a consistent manner.

Much of our experience follows reliable rules and is outside our control, yes. But this is still compatible with solipsism; it's possible that our solipsistic experience is regular and uncontrollable for no reason. On the other hand, external-world realism might provide a better explanation of our experience, even if it isn't definitively proven by our experience.

Are you fine with people doing it to you? Context fully included? No? Then don't do it.

The_Apologist posted...

Much of our experience follows reliable rules and is outside our control, yes. But this is still compatible with solipsism; it's possible that our solipsistic experience is regular and uncontrollable for no reason. On the other hand, external-world realism might provide a better explanation of our experience, even if it isn't definitively proven by our experience.

That's like saying we flip a coin a googolplex times a second and get tails every time, every second, of every day, for how unlikely that would be for our observations to be eternally consistent... purely by coincidence.

The probability of objective reality not existing, purely based on the evidence of our observations, is so low that we can dismiss the possibility entirely.

videospirit posted...

That's like saying we flip a coin a googolplex times a second and get tails every time, every second, of every day, for how unlikely that would be for our observations to be eternally consistent... purely by coincidence.

It's still possible, though.

But the solipsist can certainly do better than this; they can say that the 'laws of nature' are actually just laws governing how the solipsistic mind works. And then the regularity of experience isn't an astronomical coincidence anymore. You can ask why the solipsistic mind should operate according to regular laws, but then again we can also ask that about the physical universe.

The_Apologist posted...

It's still possible, though.

At some point a probability gets to be so low that it is in fact, not possible. In the span of a googolplex of universes cycle of birth to heat death the event will have occurred on average 0 times total across the sum experience of any of those universes. Long before that point it's pure fantasy.

But the solipsist can certainly do better than this; they can say that the 'laws of nature' are actually just laws governing how the solipsistic mind works. And then the regularity of experience isn't an astronomical coincidence anymore. You can ask why the solipsistic mind should operate according to regular laws, but then again we can also ask that about the physical universe.

And "Rules of how a mind works" once again gets us back to the difference between dreaming experience and waking experience. We know that our minds can work outside of the parameters of waking experience because we do it when we dream, the sheer fact we can both experience consistent observations and inconsistent observations sends you back into the realm of consistent observations are extremely improbable if they are not forced to be consistent by some external objective reality. When the laws of the solipsistic mind cease being consistent laws they lose their ability to explain phenomenon. Since we can't use a theoretical law of a solipsistic mind to explain the consistency of waking experience, there has to be some other explanation.

The_Apologist posted...

I don't necessarily disagree, although 'seems' is doing a lot of work there. Why can't we say that it seems as if there are objective moral facts?

Because it doesn't. It seems as if there are not. No one behaves as if there are, no test can be applied, no empirical evidence is evident.

Postulating that there are objective moral truths, how would the world be different if there were not? Would people still learn subjective morality from those around them, as they do now?

videospirit posted...

When the laws of the solipsistic mind cease being consistent laws they lose their ability to explain phenomenon.

But dreams aren't actually inconsistent. They just follow a different set of rules: psychological rules or whatever. Those rules are ultimately consistent, as far as we can tell scientifically, and thus they can be incorporated into the overarching system of 'mental rules' of the solipsist.

Daremo posted...

It seems as if there are not. No one behaves as if there are

No, most people behave as if their moral judgments are accurate apprehensions of reality. And in familiar cases, it seems as if our moral intuitions aren't up to us; I can't see someone abusing a child and then choose what my attitude toward that situation will be. This mirrors the fact that our sensory perceptions aren't up to us.

Daremo posted...

Postulating that there are objective moral truths, how would the world be different if there were not?

There's no empirical difference. But there's also no empirical difference between solipsism and external-world realism.

The_Apologist posted...

No, most people behave as if their moral judgments are accurate apprehensions of reality. And in familiar cases, it seems as if our moral intuitions aren't up to us

Interesting. It appears we may have been operating under disparate values of 'objective'. It sounds like you are using objective to mean some form of... er..., the absence of epistemological self-determinism, that is, the idea that we cannot determine what we believe(I'm dead certain there's a more concise word or phrase for that, but it is totally escaping me at the moment...), and since our moral perceptions are not (necessarily, I am not conceding this point at all) subject to our will, they must be somehow 'objective'.

Does that seem like an accurate assessment of your position?

Daremo posted...

It sounds like you are using objective to mean some form of... er..., the absence of epistemological self-determinism, that is, the idea that we cannot determine what we believe

That's not what 'objective' means ('objective' means 'mind-independent'). But I'm proposing that if something presents itself a certain way in our experience, and if the way it presents itself isn't up to us, then this is (provisional, inconclusive) evidence that the thing is independent of our minds.

This is what it means for something to seem objective to us. "Reality is what you stumble over in the dark" and all that. This, or something similar, is the most straightforward reason for thinking that the physical world exists independently of our perception of it.

After the first few pages I actually wanted to stay still because the discussion was so terrible, but then it got even worse so I can't stay still anymore.

Now what triggered me most:

This is an objective framework called utilitarianism.

Duh, I can't think of any ethical framework that isn't objective, but that doesn't mean that ethics or morale are objective.

What is ethics? Ethics in general is just about to find out what is good and what is bad. It's about how we can define good, and we can define better, and how we define bad and worse too.

Spoiler: There are multiple definitions, and many of them are contraticting each other. Most famous example here is Deontology (The action must be good in itself) vs. Teleology (The goal and the result must be good).

Please be aware that these concepts don't even define good or bad at all. They only say if an action has to be messured by the result, or not.

Now let us asume that killing is bad (that should be easy). Let us also asume that killing Putin would change the situation in Russia for the better (so we assume that the situation doesn't escalate for the worse).

Would killing Putin be good or bad?
Deontology and Teleology both have their answer set in stone, and are pure opposites. For them, the answer is 100% objective in the end. If you follow pure Deontology, killing people is objectivly bad, even if it's Putin, and if you are a Teleologist, you will say that it's objectivly good, because the result is good.

But of course, in the ethical sense, we only get more questions: How bad is "killing is bad" and how good is "Russia becomes better"? What if we are mistaken, and the succesor of Putin is even worse? How do we measure the risks in the result? What about the risks in the action?

Ethics tries to deal with all of these questions, and gives the people a shitton of rules and tools and concepts to try to define some stuff.
Some of these rules are even objectivly true. Like, actions which can be reversed are always better than actions which can't be undone if they turned out bad. That's mostly the case for binary checkboxes. "Can be undone" is simple and doesn't have to be quantified at all.

The problem is that "how much better is "can be undone"" is subjective again, and you can't call every action bad, just because it's not possible to undo them.

Now, the concept of Utilitarianism is simple. Good is, what creates the greatest happiness for most people, and the smallest unhappiness for the fewest people.

That's the concept and... that's it.
Everything that follows it is again 100% subjective.

It doesn't define happiness, unhappiness, benefit or whatever at all, we have to define this on our own.

What is better? A little happiness for many or big happiness for a few?

Is big happiness for many, with some unhappiness for the few, better than a little happiness for many, without anyone becoming unhappy?

Utilitarianism has no answer to that, because you can't quantify or measure happiness at all. Good job, we are back to subjectivity.

Even if you are 100% able to objectivly greate a score system and messure it, you still have to face many problems:

If we have action A, giving people -20 happiness and giving others +120 happiness, is this truly better than an action B that gives +90 happiness without anyone suffer for it?

What if take 100 points of happiness from some people, and give all 100 points to other. Would this be truely a a neutral action, neither good or evil?

What if we just take everything away from a single person, so only one has to suffer -10000 points, but a million other people get a benefit of +0.1? That would be ten times more happiness than suffering, so it must be good, right?

Utilitarianism is just another tool, another scale, that is supposed to be helpful to define better or worse, but isn't able to define good or bad at all.

It baffles me how someone is able to know about the core princible of Utilitarianism, but doesn't even think about the issues of pure Utilitarianism.

As with most ethical concepts Utilitarianism is useless in it's purest form, because it ignores some pretty important other concepts like justice.

That's why morality is subjective to it's core.
It's easy to call a single action good or bad in a vacuum, with no strings attached. It's easy to find the best solution if you only look at it from a specific point of view.

The problem is that reality isn't a ethical trick question, and you don't argue against a single definition of good or evil, you argue with a mix of dozens of them.

I skipped out on a huge portion of this topic after assault and skank got into it for va few hundred posts, but I wanted to bring up something.

Subjective morality would imply that morality would utilize inductive and not deductive logic, which means a moral system would not be valid or invalid, it would be cogent or uncogent. Thanks for coming to my TED talk.

The_Apologist posted...
That's not what 'objective' means ('objective' means 'mind-independent'). But I'm proposing that if something presents itself a certain way in our experience, and if the way it presents itself isn't up to us, then this is (provisional, inconclusive) evidence that the thing is independent of our minds.

This is what it means for something to seem objective to us. "Reality is what you stumble over in the dark" and all that. This, or something similar, is the most straightforward reason for thinking that the physical world exists independently of our perception of it.

Okay.

I also use a definition resembling 'mind-independent', with the base postulates that the universe exists independent of our minds and objective reality enters our perceptions, rather than the other way around.

Something wholly generated by our minds would necessarily be precluded from being objective, except possibly in a manner that is descriptive of objective reality.

I would take issue with the idea that we do not choose our morality. We do not always choose our morality, but at times we do, whether consciously or unconsciously. Morality is crafted, by us and those around us. It is built, deconstructed, rebuilt, weakened, reinforced, reworked and destroyed every moment of our lives. It is an emergent function of society, collectively formed from the individuals who make up that society. Moral shifts over time, in both societies and individuals speak to this.

So, to go back to my first post, with added clarity:

For something to be objective it would have an evident existence independent of the human mind, or describe such.

Since morality does not evidence or describe any objective reality, it cannot be objective.

Hence, morality is not objective.

Note that this conclusion is primarily driven by practical application.
If a world of objectivity or subjectivity is practically indistinguishable from the other, the question is effectively moot.

Sic Semper Philosophy!

*bang*

lot of people in here conflating morals with ethics

Karovorak posted...

Would killing Putin be good or bad?
Deontology and Teleology both have their answer set in stone, and are pure opposites. For them, the answer is 100% objective in the end. If you follow pure Deontology, killing people is objectivly bad, even if it's Putin, and if you are a Teleologist, you will say that it's objectivly good, because the result is good.

But of course, in the ethical sense, we only get more questions: How bad is "killing is bad" and how good is "Russia becomes better"? What if we are mistaken, and the succesor of Putin is even worse? How do we measure the risks in the result? What about the risks in the action?

Ethics tries to deal with all of these questions, and gives the people a s***ton of rules and tools and concepts to try to define some stuff.
Some of these rules are even objectivly true. Like, actions which can be reversed are always better than actions which can't be undone if they turned out bad. That's mostly the case for binary checkboxes. "Can be undone" is simple and doesn't have to be quantified at all.

The problem is that "how much better is "can be undone"" is subjective again, and you can't call every action bad, just because it's not possible to undo them.

Now, the concept of Utilitarianism is simple. Good is, what creates the greatest happiness for most people, and the smallest unhappiness for the fewest people.

That's the concept and... that's it.
Everything that follows it is again 100% subjective.

It doesn't define happiness, unhappiness, benefit or whatever at all, we have to define this on our own.

What is better? A little happiness for many or big happiness for a few?

Is big happiness for many, with some unhappiness for the few, better than a little happiness for many, without anyone becoming unhappy?

Utilitarianism has no answer to that, because you can't quantify or measure happiness at all. Good job, we are back to subjectivity.

In Statistics, the decision to reject the null or fail to reject the null hypothesis is 100% subjective, and as you laid here and in the rest of your post, the moral decisions we make is 100% subjective. However in Statistics there is also an objectively correct answer. The null hypothesis is either correct or wrong. In A LOT of scenarios it is physically impossible for you to know the correct value of the parameter. The error in the data, the random affect of probability, the arbitrary significance value cutoff (typically 5%) all make the reject the null hypothesis or not a subjective decision. However none of that subjectivity erases the objectivity of the parameter's value. The parameter has an objectively true value but because of error and uncertainty we are making subjective guesses at its value. Same with morality, if there is a correct answer on if we should kill Putin or not, then there's objectivity, and our failure to adequately define it and our failure to know the correct answer does not change that objectivity just as our failure to adequately measure the parameter does not change its objectively true yet unknowable value.

bfslick50 posted...

In Statistics, the decision to reject the null or fail to reject the null hypothesis is 100% subjective, and as you laid here and in the rest of your post, the moral decisions we make is 100% subjective. However in Statistics there is also an objectively correct answer. The null hypothesis is either correct or wrong. In A LOT of scenarios it is physically impossible for you to know the correct value of the parameter. The error in the data, the random affect of probability, the arbitrary significance value cutoff (typically 5%) all make the reject the null hypothesis or not a subjective decision. However none of that subjectivity erases the objectivity of the parameter's value. The parameter has an objectively true value but because of error and uncertainty we are making subjective guesses at its value. Same with morality, if there is a correct answer on if we should kill Putin or not, then there's objectivity, and our failure to adequately define it and our failure to know the correct answer does not change that objectivity just as our failure to adequately measure the parameter does not change its objectively true yet unknowable value.

That's the whole point, there is no value you can use at all.

The Putin example should already make that clear.

If you follow one ethical philosophy it's 100% bad, if you follow the other it's 100% good. There is no room of discussion within the mindsets, and that's already ignoring any other variable in such a situation.

Since we are on a gaming board, another example:
It's like saying Zelda- Tears of the Kingdom is objectivly a better game than Zelda - A Link to the past. Why? Because games with good graphics are better than games with bad graphics, and games with a lot of content are better than games with less content.

If you only look at this it's easy and objectivly measurable, but this is only a fraction of what makes a game good.

Karovorak posted...

That's the whole point, there is no value you can use at all.

The Putin example should already make that clear.

If you follow one ethical philosophy it's 100% bad, if you follow the other it's 100% good. There is no room of discussion within the mindsets, and that's already ignoring any other variable in such a situation.

Since we are on a gaming board, another example:
It's like saying Zelda- Tears of the Kingdom is objectivly a better game than Zelda - A Link to the past. Why? Because games with good graphics are better than games with bad graphics, and games with a lot of content are better than games with less content.

If you only look at this it's easy and objectivly measurable, but this is only a fraction of what makes a game good.

Well killing Putin isn't 100% good with a Teleologist world view because you haven't considered if there are better ways to achieve the good result (ending the Ukraine war) nor is it guaranteed that killing Putin results in that good result. But the point remains that the two systems can arrive at dramatically different conclusions. As how two different statistical analysis techniques can arrive at different answers. There are situations where an alternative hypothesis of > and get polar opposite results. There is 100% subjectivity in not just the decision but deciding what system to use to make the decision, but that subjectivity doesn't mean that there isn't an objective truth. The parameter still has a real value even if we don't know it. Whether or not morality is objective comes down to is there a correct answer. Not how well can we measure it, not how well we can identify it, just is there one? I think there is and as a society we are very slowly getting closer to discovering it.

bfslick50 posted...

Well killing Putin isn't 100% good with a Teleologist world view because you haven't considered if there are better ways to achieve the good result (ending the Ukraine war) nor is it guaranteed that killing Putin results in that good result. But the point remains that the two systems can arrive at dramatically different conclusions. As how two different statistical analysis techniques can arrive at different answers. There are situations where an alternative hypothesis of > and get polar opposite results. There is 100% subjectivity in not just the decision but deciding what system to use to make the decision, but that subjectivity doesn't mean that there isn't an objective truth.

Yeah, that's my point why I say that morals can't be objective, just because some tools are objective. One tool alone is simply not got enough, the question is how you balance them. As you said, these philosophical trick questions already fall apart as soon as you change something, or add another solution and force them to sort them from best to worse.

Some tools help with identifiying good and bad, but suck at quantifying them (how much would Russia need to become better to justify an assassination?) some are better to say X are better than Y, but completly fail to say what "good" actually is.

The parameter still has a real value even if we don't know it. Whether or not morality is objective comes down to is there a correct answer. Not how well can we measure it, not how well we can identify it, just is there one? I think there is and as a society we are very slowly getting closer to discovering it.

That's even more of an theoretical construct.
No, I don't thing that every situation has some true best answer. We would have to define "value", "happiness" or "suffering" before that, perfectly objective and true for all situations.

We already have a hard time to measure physical pain objectivly, measuring mental pain is much harder.

And even then we have way too many oppinions about the values itself, and how we rank them. That's why I deny the existence of a universial "best" for all situations. You can only create some ruleset for the values, but some of these values are sooner or later being in conflict with each other, no matter how noble the intention is.

Karovorak posted...

That's even more of an theoretical construct.
No, I don't thing that every situation has some true best answer. We would have to define "value", "happiness" or "suffering" before that, perfectly objective and true for all situations.

that's how we would discover the best answer. humans being able or unable to discover the best answer has no bearing on whether or not one exists

Dakimakura posted...

Subjective on what code of ethics you follow and objective within that code of ethics.

This.

Daremo posted...

Since morality does not evidence or describe any objective reality

It's possible that our moral judgments are describing the objective moral properties of things. This is often how realists state their position.

averagejoel posted...

that's how we would discover the best answer. humans being able or unable to discover the best answer has no bearing on whether or not one exists

Thank you. Even if there's no straightforward way to know moral truth, there could still be moral truth. And thus "We have no way to measure/test/observe/etc moral facts" is a bad argument against the existence of moral facts.

The_Apologist posted...

But dreams aren't actually inconsistent. They just follow a different set of rules: psychological rules or whatever. Those rules are ultimately consistent, as far as we can tell scientifically, and thus they can be incorporated into the overarching system of 'mental rules' of the solipsist.

Yeah, that's not true at all. You have to deny that a mind exists at all to claim that dreams are completely consistent and follow their own rules with no such thing as will and impossible to influence them as you'd need to do to claim what you just stated, and even if they were true, you don't even need to be dreaming to have inconsistent observations. We are not the greatest observers of objective reality. Occasionally the things we see are not the things that actually happened. The human mind is imperfect. These imperfections aren't a big deal when there is an objective universe for us to pay attention to, because what we think we saw is irrelevant when that never occurred, as we'll quickly discover that the universe has remained consistent despite our momentary inconsistent observations.

If there is no objective universe, that goes completely out the window. No such objective template can exist without being objective reality itself. Those inconsistent observations would have no way to return to consistency, and eventually the past would be inconsistent with the present the solipsistic mind observes, in a way that does not currently happen and so the theory can't explain our observations. (Although the solipsists could argue that that template exists "in their minds", that template in the mind itself would be objective reality, and it's stretching the definition of mind quite a bit to even grant them that much.)

[LFAQs-redacted-quote]


Says who?

then the most moral act possible would be the elimination of all life in the universe. In this way you reduce suffering to the point of non-existence... This is of course one of the basic problems with elimination type utilitarianism.

Okay Thanos.

Of course, when you literally need utilitarianism to make the argument that morality is subjective

Straw man, again. So lame.

your argument is nonsense anyway. Utilitarianism is pretty much a poster child for objective moral theory.

You dont know what subjective means

So is this whole topic just AssultTank failing to comprehend what subjective means over and over again

Raikuro posted...

So is this whole topic just AssultTank failing to comprehend what subjective means over and over again

if 'subjective' just means 'from the subject' then all foundational science is subjective as well.

in fact nature or appearance would be the only objective thing. anything that comes from cognition is subjective on your view because it originates from a subjective perspective. so atoms and electrons are subjective because only humans measure them.

MedeaLysistrata posted...

so atoms and electrons are subjective because only humans measure them.

Thats not what subjective means.

[LFAQs-redacted-quote]


Except nothing is not the opposite of suffering, it's merely the middle point between suffering and it's opposite. In order to minimize suffering you need to maximize happiness. It's not a zero sum. Eliminating all life in the universe may get you to a score of 0, but that's still a pretty awful score when you could get above zero.

Skankhair posted...

Thats not what subjective means.

"Generally speaking, a philosophical proposition is considered to have subjective truth when its truth conditions are met only when considering the claim from the viewpoint of a sentient being." wikipedia

MedeaLysistrata posted...

"Generally speaking, a philosophical proposition is considered to have subjective truth when its truth conditions are met only when considering the claim from the viewpoint of a sentient being." wikipedia

Atoms exist even if we dont. They are independent from the experience of living beings.

Skankhair posted...

Atoms exist even if we dont. They are independent from the experience of living beings.

So what is your arguments against

Living beings exist
Living beings experience morality
***
Morality has objectively existed

I'm not saying the contents of morality are absolute, I'm just saying it's something that objectively exists in the world

MedeaLysistrata posted...

I'm not saying the contents of morality are absolute, I'm just saying it's something that objectively exists in the world

In the same way that a scientific theory that is untrue objectively exists yeah, which is kind of irrelevant.

like it seems you are basically saying people's thoughts aren't objectively real? what do you gain from saying that?

videospirit posted...

In the same way that a scientific theory that is untrue objectively exists yeah, which is kind of irrelevant.

the topic title is shit so i don't know what to expect, TC is not gonna clarify anything because the action is too good

It's a grey area

MedeaLysistrata posted...

So what is your arguments against

Living beings exist
Living beings experience morality
***
Morality has objectively existed

Morality is experiential. That means its subjective. It exists, subjectively.

MedeaLysistrata posted...

the topic title is shit so i don't know what to expect, TC is not gonna clarify anything because the action is too good

What else am I supposed to clarify? IYO

Skankhair posted...

Morality is experiential.

I just fail to understand. Are you saying moral events wouldn't happen without living things? I understand that... But still, was it you or AssTank that said there is a best morality?

All morality is objectively good, until subjected onto someone else.

Your morals tell you how to live, and my morals tell me how to live. Problems begin when your morals start telling me how to live, or vice-versa. More so if one of our moralities is telling the other to die.

Questionmarktarius posted...

All morality is objectively good, until subjected onto someone else.

Your morals tell you how to live, and my morals tell me how to live. Problems begin when your morals start telling me how to live, or vice-versa. More so if one of our moralities is telling the other to die.

Shut the fuck up and get fit and married